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LISA GROW SUN† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, both public officials and 
the mainstream media painted a dramatic and deeply disturbing 
picture of violence and looting in devastated New Orleans. The New 
Orleans Police Superintendent asserted that “little babies [were] 
getting raped” in the Superdome, a shelter where hurricane survivors 
took refuge.1 As a guest on the Oprah Winfrey Show, New Orleans 
Mayor Ray Nagin reported that Katrina’s survivors were sinking into 
an “almost animalistic state” after days of “watching hooligans killing 
people, raping people.”2 
Similar accounts dominated newspaper headlines and TV 
coverage of Katrina for days. The media consistently depicted post-
Katrina New Orleans both as a city descending into anarchy and 
violence and as a war-zone in which Katrina’s victims attacked those 
who had come to their aid. Epitomizing this alarming rhetoric, a New 
York Times editorial reported that New Orleans was “a snake pit of 
anarchy, death, looting, raping, marauding thugs, suffering innocents, 
a shattered infrastructure, a gutted police force, insufficient troop 
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 1. Oprah Reports, OPRAH.COM (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.oprah.com/slideshow/ 
oprahshow/oprahshow1_ss_20050906/2; see Joseph B. Treaster & Abby Goodnough, Powerful 
Storm Threatens Havoc Along Gulf Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/29/national/29storm.html?scp=1&sq=Powerful%20Storm%20
Threatens%20Havoc%20Along%20Gulf%20Coast&st=cse (describing how the Superdome 
functioned as a designated shelter of last resort, where almost ten thousand people sought 
refuge). 
 2. Brian Thevenot, Myth-Making in New Orleans, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2005–
Jan. 2006, at 30, 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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levels and criminally negligent government planning.”3 Not to be 
outdone, the Financial Times of London asserted that, at the 
Convention Center, another shelter of last resort for New Orleans’ 
besieged citizens, “girls and boys were raped in the dark and had their 
throats cut and bodies were stuffed in the kitchens while looters and 
madmen exchanged fire with weapons they had looted.”4 The lead 
news story in the Los Angeles Times described National Guard troops 
taking “positions on rooftops, scanning for snipers and armed mobs 
as seething crowds of refugees milled below, desperate to flee.”5 
Television coverage likewise asserted that looting had overtaken New 
Orleans. Television channels played clips of Katrina survivors taking 
goods from deserted stores in a seemingly never-ending 24-hour loop. 
Yet these unrelenting tales of anarchy, violence, and chaos in 
post-Katrina New Orleans proved to be, at best, greatly exaggerated 
and, at worst, utterly false. Nearly a month after Katrina struck New 
Orleans, major news outlets retracted many of their previous reports 
of widespread violence and crime in Katrina’s wake.6 Unfortunately, 
the early reports have proved resilient, and the truth has never fully 
overtaken the myth. 
II. DISASTER MYTHOLOGY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
The myths about post-disaster human behavior that took hold in 
the aftermath of Katrina were not unique to that catastrophe. More 
than three decades earlier, disaster sociologists had identified several 
important public misconceptions about typical human behavior in the 
aftermath of disasters.7 These misconceptions—also called “disaster 
myths”—include (1) the myth that widespread antisocial behavior, 
such as violence and looting, is common after disasters; (2) the myth 
 
 3. Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., United States of Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2005, at A21, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/03/opinion/03dowd.html?scp=1&sq=Maureen% 
20Dowd%20United%20States%20of%20Shame&st=cse. 
 4. Guy Dinmore, City of Rape, Rumour and Recrimination, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at 7. 
 5. Ellen Barry, Scott Gold & Stephen Braun, New Orleans Slides into Chaos; U.S. 
Scrambles to Send Troops, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2005/sep/02/nation/na-katrina2. 
 6. Compare id., with Jim Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime’s Reality in 
New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/ 
national/nationalspecial/29crime.html?scp=1&sq=Fear%20Exceeded%20Crime%27s%20Realit
y&st=cse, and Susannah Rosenblatt & James Rainey, Katrina Takes a Toll on Truth, News 
Accuracy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A16, and Brian Thevenot & Gordon Russell, Rape. 
Murder. Gunfights., NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1. 
 7.  E.L. Quarantelli & Russell R. Dynes, When Disaster Strikes (It Isn’t Much Like What 
You’ve Heard & Read About), 5 PSYCHOL. TODAY 67, 67–69 (1972). 
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that most disaster survivors will panic and engage in irrational flight 
behavior; and (3) the myth that disaster survivors commonly suffer a 
shock reaction that paralyzes them and interferes with their ability to 
respond to the disaster and care for themselves and others.8 
Understanding how these myths gain traction during disasters is 
important because these misconceptions distort our legal and policy 
framework for disaster response and recovery. The myth of 
widespread antisocial activity, for example, has resulted in a U.S. 
legal system of disaster response that overemphasizes security risks at 
the expense of humanitarian efforts to rescue and care for survivors.9 
First, exaggerated reports of looting and violence post-disaster make 
the President more likely to deploy federal troops in a law 
enforcement capacity, rather than a humanitarian capacity, and less 
likely to deploy troops at all if the President decides for legal or 
political reasons not to invest federal troops with law enforcement 
authority.10 Second, such exaggerated reports also tend to delay aid to 
survivors. After Katrina, Mayor Nagin reacted to exaggerated reports 
of violence and looting by diverting 1,500 New Orleans police officers 
from search and rescue missions to anti-looting patrol.11 Officials also 
delayed delivery of desperately needed food, water, and sanitation 
supplies to shelters of last resort until massive military escorts could 
be assembled to accompany the deliveries and respond to the looting 
and gangs that officials expected the shipments to encounter.12 Third, 
public officials may respond to inflated fears of looting and violence 
by implementing restrictions on freedom and freedom of 
movement—such as roadblocks, curfews, and vague declarations of 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1136 
(2011) (outlining deleterious effects of disaster myths on survivors). 
 10.  Id. at 1152. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President Bush’s advisors 
apparently advised him that invoking the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006), to 
federalize state National Guard units and invest those units and federal regular troops with law 
enforcement authority would be problematic because of the potential political ramifications of 
seizing control from Louisiana’s female, Democratic governor. See Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt & 
Thom Shanker, Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1. 
Concern about sending federal troops without law enforcement authority into the chaotic 
environment described in the exaggerated reports then delayed commitment of federal troops 
to New Orleans to meet vital humanitarian needs. See Sun, supra note 9, at 1161–62. 
 11.  Id. at 1174–75 (citing New Orleans Mayor Orders Looting Crackdown, MSNBC.COM 
(Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9063708/ (recounting how New Orleans Mayor 
Nagin “ordered 1,500 police officers to leave their search-and-rescue mission Wednesday 
night . . . to stop looting that has turned increasingly hostile”). 
 12.  Id. at 1176; Katy Reckdahl, The Myths of New Orleans, TUCSON WEEKLY, Aug. 24, 
2006, http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/the-myths-of-new-orleans/Content?oid=1085005. 
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“martial law”—that may risk excessive use of force by police, 
interfere with response efforts, delay evacuated residents’ return to 
their homes, and violate basic rights.13 Private citizens may likewise 
react to the myth by engaging in vigilante behavior to protect 
themselves and their property from perceived, but largely imaginary, 
threats.14 Fourth, the prevalence of the disaster myth of looting and 
violence convinces us to squander post-disaster political capital on 
enacting unnecessary looting laws, often at the expense of adopting 
hazard mitigation measures that might protect lives and property 
during the next hazard event.15 
In addition to these concrete, detrimental effects on our legal 
and policy framework for disaster response, exaggerated reports of 
widespread looting and violence can also stigmatize disaster victims.16 
That stigma can make other communities less receptive to taking in 
disaster survivors, in both the short and long term. In the short term, 
communities may balk at setting up evacuation centers and shelters 
for displaced survivors. In the long term, those survivors who choose 
to permanently relocate to another community may face 
discrimination in employment and other opportunities.17 
Katrina survivors from New Orleans faced this kind of stigma in 
cities where they took refuge. For example, many New Orleans 
residents relocated, at least temporarily, to Houston. During that 
time, it was widely reported in both the local and national news that 
Katrina survivors were responsible for a wave of crime in the 
Houston area.18 Studies later disproved the existence of a “Katrina 
 
 13.  Sun, supra note 9, at 1178. 
 14.  Id. at 1148. 
 15.  Id. at 1198. 
 16.  See Gail Garfield, Hurricane Katrina: The Making of Unworthy Disaster Victims, 10 J. 
AFR. AM. ST. 55, 58 (2007) (describing the effects of “rampant black criminality . . . reported in 
news accounts” on the government’s emergency response). 
   17.   See CTR. FOR SOC. WORK RESEARCH, KATRINA EVACUEES IN AUSTIN, TEXAS: 
ANALYSIS OF NEEDS ASSESSMENT DATA 8 (2006), available at http://www.utexas.edu/research/ 
cswr/katrina/Documents/City%20of%20Aus%20Final%20Report.pdf (reporting “evidence of 
discrimination or negative stereotypes that undermined the successful employment of evacuees 
who remained in Texas, particularly in the Houston area where hostility ran particularly high”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Miguel Bustillo, Houston Grumbles as Evacuees Stay Put, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
21, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/aug/21/nation/na-evac21. Although Katrina evacuees 
were stereotyped, in part, because of the high crime rates that plagued New Orleans prior to the 
storm, see, e.g., Nicole Gelinas, Katrina Refugees Shoot Up Houston, CITY J., http://www.city-
journal.org/html/eon2006-01-04ng.html (“[I]t’s also irrefutable that when New Orleans was 
inundated with floodwaters, what flooded out of the Crescent City was a core criminal 
underclass that, before the storm, generated the highest urban murder rate in the nation.”), the 
reports of widespread looting and violence in Katrina’s aftermath contributed to the public 
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crime wave,” ushered in by evacuees from New Orleans, but the 
stigma remains.19 The stigmatization of Katrina survivors as violent 
criminals has also resulted in employment and housing discrimination 
against survivors.20 
III. DISASTER MYTH PERPETUATION AS AN AVAILABILITY 
CASCADE 
These detrimental consequences of the disaster myth of 
widespread violence and looting demonstrate the necessity of finding 
political and legal tools to counter the myth’s perpetuation and its 
effects on our framework for disaster response and recovery.21 
Considering the perpetuation of disaster mythology as an “availability 
cascade” may be helpful in understanding the myth’s spread22 and in 
generating possible options for countering the myth and its 
consequences. 
Cass Sunstein and Timur Kuran have defined an “availability 
cascade” as “a self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation 
by which an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives 
the perception increasing plausibility through its rising availability in 
public discourse.”23 More simply, an availability cascade results from 
the “interaction of the ‘availability heuristic’—a mental shortcut by 
which an individual judges the probability of an event by his or her 
ability to conjure up examples of that event—and the social 
mechanisms through which risk perceptions are propagated.”24 
 
perception that Katrina evacuees were criminals, see, e.g., Dan Vergano, No Crime Wave 
Among Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, U.S.A. TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/weather/ 
storms/hurricanes/2010-02-12-hurricane-katrina-crime_N.htm (quoting disaster scholar Joseph 
Trainor for the proposition that “[a] crime wave spawned by evacuees is typical of ‘disaster 
myths’ seen after catastrophes”). 
 19.  See James Pinkerton, Study: Katrina Crime Wave Nonexistent in Houston, HOUS. 
CHRON., Feb. 15, 2010, http://www.chron.com/disp.story.mpl/metropolitan/ 6868718.html# 
ixzz1NV6taCRz (“A huge crime wave blamed on thousands of Katrina evacuees in Houston 
and other Southwest cities never happened, say criminologists who warned public officials and 
the media to be careful in attributing crime to the former New Orleans residents.”). 
 20.  Reckdahl, supra note 12. 
 21.  See Sun, supra note 9, at 1136 (outlining legal and political measures that could help 
counter the harmful effects of the disaster myth). 
 22.  Id. at 1150. 
 23.  Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 683, 683 (1999); Kuran and Sunstein consider examples such as Love Canal, Alar in 
apples, airplane safety, asbestos, and Agent Orange in their analysis of availability cascades. See 
id. at 691–703. 
 24.  Sun, supra note 9, at 1150 (quoting Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685). 
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The mental “availability” of violence and looting as disaster risks 
is amplified in the United States by a popular culture of disaster 
movies and by media reporting of disasters, both of which—not 
surprisingly—focus on such antisocial behavior in disasters’ 
aftermath: 
The calm, helping behaviors typically exhibited by disaster 
survivors are hardly the fodder of either attention grabbing 
headlines or fast-paced entertainment. Those portrayals of disaster 
increase the mental ‘availability’ of violence and looting as disaster 
risks by proliferating examples of disaster-related violence and 
looting (even if those examples never, in fact, occurred).25 
A disaster risk that has a human component—like looting and 
violence—may also be more “available” mentally than the underlying 
risks posed by the natural hazard event itself because manmade risks 
tend to be more salient in people’s minds than those that appear to be 
naturally created.26 While some academics (like Sunstein and Kuran) 
are likely to view this tendency to focus on and react more strongly to 
manmade risks than “natural risks” as a cognitive error, others (like 
Dan Kahan of Yale’s Cultural Cognition Project) might view this 
tendency as a culturally mediated value judgment.27 Regardless of 
 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 709; Lennart Sjoberg, Risk Perception: 
Experts and the Public, 3 EUR. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 1, 3, Mar. 1999 (“[P]eople seem to react much 
stronger to man-made risks and disasters caused by human error or negligent behavior than to 
disasters of a similar magnitude.” (citation omitted)). 
It is a truism among disaster scholars that there is no such thing as a “natural” disaster, because 
such disasters are caused by the interaction of human social systems with hazard events. Gilbert 
White, the influential geographer who shaped much early disaster scholarship, wrote more than 
seventy years ago that “[f]loods are ‘acts of god,’ but flood losses are largely acts of man.” John 
Schwartz, Obituary, Gilbert F. White, 94, Expert on Floods and Nature, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/07/obituaries/07white.html. The same is true for other 
types of “natural” disasters, as well. Nonetheless, the average citizen may be less aware of this 
human contribution to so-called natural disasters, and thus seems likely to view the associated 
risk as primarily natural (rather than manmade) in origin. 
 27. Sun, supra note 9, at 1151 (citing Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk 
Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008) (asserting that “emotional apprehensions of risk 
reflect persons’ expressive appraisals of putatively dangerous activates”)). Kahan does not 
challenge the existence of availability cascades, but contends that shared “cultural 
commitments” help determine which risk perceptions are likely to take hold in certain groups 
and that risk perceptions are likely to “feed upon one another among persons who share 
cultural commitments.” See Kahan, supra, at 757 (“[I]nsofar as one of the primary sources of 
information people have about the relationship between their values and a putatively dangerous 
activity is what persons who share their commitments think about it, perceptions of danger 
naturally feed upon one another among persons who share cultural commitments.”). Thus, 
Kahan suggests that informational cascades are likely to be bounded by—rather than bridge—
existing divides between groups with different cultural commitments. On this view, 
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how one characterizes this tendency, the consequence is that at least 
some members of the public may be predisposed to believe that 
violence and looting are common reactions to disasters because of the 
salience of those manmade risks. 
Sunstein and Kuran’s work on availability cascades focuses on 
the role of two (often interrelated) social mechanisms that produce 
and amplify availability cascades: “informational cascades” and 
“reputational cascades.”28 An informational cascade—or “bandwagon 
or snowballing process”—arises when individuals “base their own 
beliefs on the apparent beliefs of others” because those individuals 
lack complete information about the relevant issues.29 Informational 
cascades occur, in part, because of the “bounded rationality” of 
human beings: individuals necessarily lack the time, resources, and 
mental energy to gain perfect information on every matter; therefore, 
individuals may be inclined to accept a particular view “simply 
[because] of its acceptance by others.”30 Informational cascades may 
be particularly likely to occur in the aftermath of disasters, which 
often curtail access to information by disrupting communication 
networks and which also bring basic survival needs to the forefront, 
perhaps crowding out some attempts to verify the accuracy of 
information received from fellow survivors and other sources. 
Hurricane survivors, for example, “may be inclined to believe that 
looting is likely to occur simply because their neighbors post signs 
declaring that ‘Looters will be shot,’ reflecting the neighbors’ 
apparent belief that looting is a serious problem.”31 They may also be 
inclined to believe word-of-mouth reports from fellow survivors that 
looting and violence are occurring because they lack adequate means 
and time to verify the stories and believing a false report is likely to 
appear less personally costly than disbelieving a report that turns out 
to be true.32 
 
informational cascades usually occur in groups with shared cultural commitments, rather than 
spanning groups with divergent preexisting commitments. Id. 
 28.  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685. 
 29.  Id. at 685–86. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Sun, supra note 9, at 1151. 
 32.  Because individuals often will not be aware of the true cost to them (and will not 
internalize the societal costs) of “false positives”—reports that reflect exaggerated or untrue 
claims of looting and violence, they are likely to focus on the risk to them and their families of 
“false negatives”—failure to raise the alarm and take proper protection against looting and 
violence that is actually occurring. Accordingly, individuals may be more inclined to believe 
exaggerated or false claims of looting and violence than to discount those claims, and the 
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The second social mechanism for spreading availability errors is 
a reputational cascade. A reputational cascade occurs when an 
individual embraces a certain view in her public dealings (a view 
which may conflict with the person’s own privately held view) to 
garner public approval or forestall public criticism or censure.33 For 
example, a state governor might call out the state National Guard to 
police a disaster-devastated area, not because she believes that 
looting and violence are likely to occur, but because she believes her 
constituents are concerned about those risks and will criticize her for 
failing to take action to counter those risks.34 Similarly, a state 
legislator might propose passing or strengthening a state looting law 
after a serious disaster in his state, not because he believes the law is 
necessary to deal with disaster looting, but because he believes he can 
score political points with his constituents who worry about looting of 
their homes. 
Observations gleaned from the perpetuation of disaster 
mythology suggest that perhaps reputational cascades should be 
viewed as a subset of a broader category we might term “false 
acquiescence cascades.” Individuals may have various motivations, 
aside from reputational interests, for “false acquiescence”—acting 
and speaking as though they hold a particular view, when in fact they 
do not,35 including motivations that are more public-regarding.36 For 
example, during Hurricane Gilbert, one city emergency manager, 
who knew that “looting rarely occurs,” “took very public precautions 
to prevent looting” in order “to convince citizens that it was safe to 
evacuate.”37 This example suggests that once a risk assessment has 
achieved a certain threshold of acceptance, individuals may acquiesce 
in, and even participate in, the perpetuation of that assessment, even 
if they disagree with it, for fear that the assessment is too widely held 
 
“informational cascade” will be perpetuated. 
 33.  See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 686–87. 
 34.  Sun, supra note 9, at 1151. 
 35.  Kuran refers to this phenomenon as “preference falsification,” TIMUR KURAN, 
PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE 
FALSIFICATION ix (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997), so these “false acquiescence cascades” might 
also be termed “preference falsification cascades.” However, Kuran defines “preference 
falsification” primarily as misrepresentation of private preferences induced by “social 
pressures” such as reputational interests. Id. “False acquiescence” is intended to capture a 
broader range of motivations. 
 36.  See KURAN, supra note 35, at 3. 
 37.  HENRY W. FISCHER, III, RESPONSE TO DISASTER: FACT VERSUS FICTION AND ITS 
PERPETUATION; THE SOCIOLOGY OF DISASTER 51 (Univ. Press of Am., 3d ed. 2008). 
Sun (Do Not Delete) 1/7/2013  7:52 PM 
Fall 2012] DISASTER MYTHOLOGY AND AVAILABILITY CASCADES 81 
to be effectively countered and that failure to respond to that 
assessment will produce adverse social consequences. We might call 
this subset of false acquiescence cascades “futility cascades.” 
Futility cascades might occur in many different contexts beyond 
the propagation of disaster myths. For example, a public official who 
is convinced of the validity of anthropogenic climate change, but 
whose constituency is dominated by climate change skeptics, might 
decide to frame government measures she believes would help 
mitigate climate change as promoting efficiency or reducing some 
other pollutant, rather than as mitigating green house gases. She 
might adopt this stance because she believes that public opinion on 
climate change is currently intransigent in her area and that framing 
the necessary measures as climate change mitigation will be 
counterproductive and will inhibit their adoption. Thus, she might 
publicly appear to acquiesce in climate change skepticism by 
implicitly or explicitly endorsing the view that the measures should 
only be undertaken to serve other, less controversial, goals in order to 
secure their implementation. Scholars have thus far given insufficient 
attention to the possibility that public officials (or other individuals) 
might acquiesce in—and even promote—a particular conception of 
risk for reasons that are less about bounded rationality or 
reputational interests and more grounded in that individual’s desire 
to further the public good in the face of substantial and intractable 
opposition to what the individual views as the “correct” assessment of 
risk. 
IV. POTENTIAL TOOLS FOR COUNTERING DISASTER MYTH 
PERPETUATION 
Framing the perpetuation of disaster mythology as an availability 
cascade may be helpful in addressing the problems created by disaster 
myths because scholars have already identified some tools to reduce 
the deleterious effects availability cascades can have on risk 
regulation. These tools include altering the incentives of so-called 
“availability entrepreneurs” and insulating decision-makers from 
political pressures generated by availability cascades. 
The first of these ideas suggests that availability cascades might 
be addressed by changing the incentives of those who are principally 
responsible for both setting the cascade in motion and perpetuating 
its spread. Sunstein and Kuran posit the existence of “availability 
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entrepreneurs,” who “instigat[e] and manipulat[e] . . . availability 
campaigns,” often to achieve some political end.38 In the disaster myth 
context, at least some of those most directly involved in myth 
perpetuation—Hollywood producers and media—seem driven less by 
political aims and more by commercial concerns. These myth 
perpetuators seem to be unwitting “entrepreneurs” at best, at least in 
terms of the political and social effects of disaster mythology. 
Even the incentives of some of these accidental entrepreneurs 
potentially could be altered, however, by imposing penalties for the 
perpetuation of availability cascades based on false premises. For 
example, Kuran and Sunstein discuss the possibility of product 
defamation laws as one way to deter availability cascades that 
exaggerate the dangers posed by particular products.39 The parallel 
remedy for disaster myths might be group libel suits, brought by 
disaster survivors. In the case of post-Katrina New Orleans, there is 
evidence that the false media reporting permanently stigmatized New 
Orleanians as a group, as dangerous and violent people, who are 
undeserving of our assistance.40 As suggested earlier, that stigma has 
followed many displaced Katrina survivors to their new homes 
(whether temporary or permanent) in other cities, making it more 
difficult for them to find both housing and jobs.41 The stigmatization 
of New Orleans Katrina survivors may also have influenced the 
amount of money the country has been willing to commit to 
rebuilding New Orleans.42 
However, because group libel suits have been all but eliminated 
by the United States Supreme Court on First Amendment grounds, 
they are neither a remedy for these potential harms in the U.S., nor 
an effective deterrent of similar myth-perpetuation in the future.43 
Nevertheless, given that the media have no obvious political 
 
 38.  See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 733; see also id. at 713 (“Availability cascades 
do not appear randomly. For one thing, activists choose which dangers to stress publicly. For 
another, if an availability cascade is to unfold, enough people must initially be receptive to it.”). 
 39.  Id. at 749–51. 
 40.  Garfield, supra note 16, at 58. 
 41.  See Reckdahl, supra note 12 (recounting anecdotes of discrimination suffered by 
displaced New Orleans residents in Houston). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute making it 
unlawful to engage in group libel against a “class of citizens,” Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 
250, 251–57 (1952), this holding has been severely undermined by the Court’s subjection of 
defamation law to First Amendment inquiry under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). 
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motivation for perpetuating disaster mythology and have at least an 
aspirational commitment to truth, a targeted information campaign 
that exposes disaster mythology and suggests other attention-
grabbing headlines (like dramatic rescues) might succeed in 
decreasing media reporting of disaster myths.44 
Disaster sociologists Kathleen Tierney and Christine Bevc have 
perhaps identified a more purposeful availability entrepreneur of 
looting and violence mythology by positing that those who favor 
militarism in society will tend to perpetuate mythology that sets the 
stage for militarized disaster response.45 Other potential myth 
perpetuators include law-enforcement agencies in the affected areas, 
who might fear losing control and might hope that rumors of looting 
and violence will result either in outside reinforcements or loosening 
of constitutional or other restraints on law enforcement activities (as 
under the popular conception of “martial law”).46 Local public 
officials (as well as business owners and disaster survivors in affected 
areas), desperate for a quick influx of outside aid, might also 
exaggerate law-and-order difficulties on the ground in an effort to 
spur faster state and federal response.47 The same officials might 
exaggerate law-and-order difficulties for an entirely different reason: 
to justify and excuse slow or inept governmental response.48 
Conversely, political opponents of current officeholders might 
attempt to get a jump-start on the “blame game” that often follows 
natural disasters49 by exaggerating the prevalence of looting and 
violence in the disaster’s aftermath. More fundamentally, 
emphasizing that disaster-induced governmental breakdown or 
incapacity results in a kind of Hobbesian state of nature among 
survivors may justify more mundane, everyday governmental 
exercises of power outside the disaster context, as well, by reaffirming 
that only government stands between us and chaos. 
Some of these incentives to perpetuate the disaster myth could 
 
 44.  Cf. FISCHER, supra note 37, at 93 (reporting that education in disaster myths improved 
the accuracy of two newspaper reporters’ coverage of a local disaster). 
 45.  See Kathleen Tierney & Christine Bevc, Disaster as War: Militarism and the Social 
Construction of Disaster in New Orleans, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF KATRINA: PERSPECTIVES ON A 
MODERN CATASTROPHE 35, 39 (David L. Brunsma et al. eds., 2007). 
 46.  See id. at 1182. 
 47.  See id. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  See, e.g., J. Steven Picou & Brent K. Marshall, Introduction: Katrina as Paradigm Shift: 
Reflections on Disaster Research in the Twenty-First Century, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF KATRINA 
supra note 45, at 1, 13. 
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potentially be countered by amending disaster laws and plans to 
preclude the outcomes the “availability entrepreneurs” seek. For 
example, the Insurrection Act,50 which allows the President to invest 
federal military troops (or federalized National Guard troops) with 
law enforcement powers during, inter alia, “insurrections,”51 could be 
interpreted narrowly to preclude the President from deploying 
federal military as disaster police absent clear evidence of widespread 
rebellion against government authority. Making clear that there is a 
substantial threshold that must be met before investing military with 
law enforcement authority during natural disasters might convince 
would-be availability entrepreneurs who favor militarization of 
disaster response that exaggerating law-and-order difficulties to force 
the militarization of the federal response would likely be futile.52 
Similarly, if the relevant state and local disaster laws preclude the 
imposition of martial law during a disaster (or the suspension of 
federal constitutional rights), local police may be less likely to 
exaggerate rates of looting and violence because they know that such 
rumors cannot be invoked to justify restrictions on basic rights.53 
Making clear to local officials that, historically, attempts to speed aid 
by overplaying law-enforcement concerns have often backfired, 
slowing the delivery of aid and interfering with recovery efforts, 
might also mitigate public officials’ incentives to perpetuate inflated 
rumors of violence and looting.54 These mechanisms for 
disincentivizing myth perpetuation may be important tools for 
countering disaster mythology. 
The second of Kuran and Sunstein’s ideas suggests reliance on 
politically insulated, deliberative expert decision-makers as a solution 
to the arguably irrational risk regulation spurred by availability 
cascades.55 In particular, they recommend that these politically 
insulated decision-makers employ cost-benefit analysis. Dan Kahan 
 
 50.  10 U.S.C. §§ 331–335 (2006). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  See Sun, supra note 9, at 1170. There is always the possibility, of course, that insisting 
on a high threshold of looting and violence before the Insurrection Act can be invoked (or other 
protective measures authorized) might actually lead local officials to exaggerate claims of 
looting and violence to demonstrate that the triggering threshold has been met. Social scientists 
should continue, where possible and appropriate, to undertake careful empirical study of the 
effects of different triggering thresholds on the exaggeration of looting and violence during 
disasters, and the law should respond to their findings accordingly. 
 53.  Id. at 1182. 
 54.  Id. at 1178. 
 55.  Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 752–58. 
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criticizes this proposal, arguing that emotional assessments of risk 
reflect cultural value judgments that may be entitled to some weight 
in policy-making, which therefore should be democratically 
accountable rather than insulated from politics.56 
What kinds of cultural value judgments might contribute to a 
heightened willingness to believe that post-disaster looting and 
violence are serious disaster risks that should be prioritized over 
other risks that exist in a disaster’s aftermath? Perhaps some 
individuals believe it is worse to have property stolen by looters than 
to have it destroyed by the hazard itself. Similarly, some individuals 
might believe it is worse to be injured or killed in post-disaster 
violence than by either the hazard event or the humanitarian crisis 
the disaster may trigger. While it is possible that such cultural 
commitments exist, they may do substantial harm to others who do 
not share these commitments (by, for example, delaying aid).57 
Moreover, it seems equally likely—if not more likely—that the myth 
of post-disaster violence has found a warm reception with at least 
some audiences because of racism and classism58 or because of a 
propensity to blame victims in order to justify the status quo59—
cultural commitments that clearly should not be given weight in 
policy-making. 
Although Kahan’s concerns do not seem particularly weighty in 
this context, assigning disaster decision-making to politically insulated 
experts would nonetheless be problematic. The decisions made in a 
disaster’s immediate aftermath about issues such as response 
priorities and curfews seem like particularly poor candidates for 
insulated, deliberative expert decision-making. First, in contrast to 
most risk regulation that Congress undertakes, lives at stake in 
disaster decision-making are not vague, unidentifiable victims 
reduced to statistics, but concrete, more easily identifiable individuals 
whose lives and wellbeing are immediately affected. Local citizens, 
rightly, will demand that their elected officials make such critical 
 
 56.  See Kahan, supra note 27, at 760–61. 
 57.  Kahan himself acknowledges that not all such value judgments are entitled to weight in 
the democratic process, particularly if imposing those judgments on others “exposes [them] . . . 
to significant physical harm or restrictions on liberty.” Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural 
Evaluators of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 171 (2006). In any event, I 
reject politically insulated decision-makers for some of the same reasons Kahan does. 
 58.  Sun, supra note 9, at 1149. 
 59.  Jaime L. Napier, Anesu N. Mandisodza, Susan M. Andersen & John T. Jost, System 
Justification in Responding to the Poor and Displaced in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 6 
ANALYSES OF SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 57, 64 (2006). 
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decisions. Second, all the planning in the world cannot anticipate the 
precise problems, demands on resources, and trade-offs that will have 
to be considered in a particular disaster situation. Much of the critical 
information will not be available until the disaster occurs—and even 
then serious information gaps will likely exist. Moreover, decisions 
will have to be made under tremendous time pressure in order to 
minimize deaths, injuries, and property damage.60 These 
circumstances will generally require quick executive action rather 
than deliberative decision-making by some politically insulated body. 
Third, most disaster decision-making occurs at state and local levels. 
Given this multiplicity of decision-makers, it is difficult to imagine 
that each state or locality would have the political will or the 
resources to employ insulated experts for disaster decision-making. 
This is particularly true given the uncertainty about which localities 
will actually suffer major disasters and be forced to call upon those 
decision-makers. 
Nonetheless, there is significant value in ensuring that disaster 
decision-makers have access to advice and counsel from emergency-
managers who are educated in the pitfalls of disaster mythology. 
Thus, a first step toward countering disaster mythology may be legally 
requiring61 or otherwise incentivizing62 states and local governments to 
 
 60.  Of course, disaster priorities and plans can and should be put in place before disasters 
occur. See David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1380 (2011) (arguing 
that disaster decisions often should be made in advance, rather than procrastinated until the 
time of a disaster, because “while information typically becomes more plentiful over time, other 
inputs to legal decisions, particularly decisional resources, often become scarcer”). In practice, 
however, disaster planning sometimes tends to veer toward the production of what disaster 
sociologist Lee Clarke terms “fantasy documents,” which serve primarily to reassure an 
organization’s constituencies rather than provide effective blueprints for disaster response. See 
generally LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE: USING FANTASY DOCUMENTS TO TAME 
DISASTER (U. Chi. Press, 2001). As a descriptive, if not normative matter, some gaps in 
planning are to be expected. Moreover, some types of disaster decisions—like planning how 
buses will be used to evacuate populations who lack personal transportation, see Super, supra, at 
1448—are more amenable to advance decision-making than others because some decisions do 
not depend on precise information about where a disaster strikes and what kind of damage it 
inflicts. 
 61.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-27(a)(3)(F)-(G) (2007) (requiring, in most circumstances, 
that directors and deputy directors of local emergency management organizations hired after 
July 1, 1999, be certified under the Georgia Emergency Management Agency’s Certified 
Emergency Manager Program and comply with continuing education requirements); see also 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-1a (West 2007) (requiring that the commissioner of the 
Connecticut Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security “possess 
professional training and knowledge consisting of not less than five years of managerial or 
strategic planning experience in matters relating to public safety, security, emergency services 
and emergency response”). 
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hire emergency managers who have sufficient education or 
experience in managing disasters. Insisting that state and local 
emergency-managers fulfill continuing education requirements would 
also be valuable, particularly if the curriculum specifically requires 
education about disaster mythology. Similarly, the relatively new 
requirements for the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) administrator, imposed by the Post Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006,63 are an important step toward 
ensuring that federal decision-makers have more expert input.64 
Some empirical evidence supports the conclusion that education 
of local emergency managers would be beneficial in counteracting 
disaster mythology. Although local emergency-managers are more 
aware of disaster myths than the general public,65 research suggests 
that many still believe important components of disaster mythology. 
In a recent survey of local emergency-managers, an overwhelming 
majority (85%) “understood that survivors usually are the first to 
engage in search and rescue activities,”66 but only half (50%) realized 
that victims generally do not panic during a disaster.67 “Less than half 
 
 62. See ALA. CODE § 31-9-61 to -62 (LexisNexis 2006) (encouraging local emergency 
managers to meet state certification—which requires at least two years of college education, 
three years of relevant work experience, and 200 hours of state emergency management 
coursework—by providing salary supplements to certified emergency management directors or, 
if their salaries already meet a certain threshold, providing the employing entity “an additional 
allocation of federal funds” for local planning and mitigation programs). 
 63.  Pub. L. No. 109-295, §§ 689b(b)-689c, 120 Stat. 1394, 1449 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 774–
75 (2006)). 
 64.  See 6 U.S.C. § 313 (2006) (requiring that the FEMA administrator have “a 
demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security” and 
“not less than 5 years of executive leadership and management experience in the public or 
private sector”). These requirements were imposed largely in reaction to President Bush’s 
appointment of Michael Brown, who lacked any significant emergency management experience, 
as FEMA Director, which was widely viewed as political cronyism that cost Katrina victims 
dearly. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed, All the President’s Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2005, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/opinion/12krugman.html. In contrast, the 
current FEMA Administrator, Craig Fugate, is widely regarded as a capable and experienced 
emergency manager. See Ginger Thompson, Emergency Manager Chosen for FEMA, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9401EEDD113DF 
936A35750C0A96F9C8B63. 
The Post-Katrina Act “also aims to increase the professionalism and expertise of FEMA staff by 
requiring FEMA to develop a ‘strategic human capital plan,’ and establish ‘appropriate career 
paths’—including requisite training, education, and experience—for agency personnel.” 
DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW 
AND POLICY 135 (2d ed. 2010) (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 10102, 10103 (2006)). 
 65.  See FISCHER, supra note 37, at 124–25. 
 66.  Id. at 125. 
 67.  Id. at 126. 
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(46%)” of those surveyed “knew that survivors usually do not behave 
irrationally due to the shock of the experience.”68 Thirty-nine percent 
believed that residents will engage in looting.69 
Those local emergency managers who had taken more training 
courses, experienced at least two disasters, worked as emergency 
managers for more than five years, or had additional education had 
more accurate views of post-disaster human behavior.70 Neither 
general work experience in the disaster field nor participation in 
disaster drills was positively correlated with more accurate views.71 
“Education had a greater impact than disaster experience, or any of 
the job experience variables (training seminars, drills, years on the 
job, and years in the field).”72 The survey results suggest that “hiring 
individuals with a college degree and then involving them in an on-
going [emergency-management] training program is optimal.”73 
Requiring that emergency-managers be college-educated may pay 
dividends in other respects, as well. Evidence suggests that the only 
factor positively correlated with an emergency manager’s adoption of 
mitigation measures (to prevent future disaster costs) is increased 
education.74 
Of course, having more highly educated, better-informed 
decision-makers is not a full solution to the problems created by 
disaster mythology. Indeed, as discussed earlier, even the best-
educated decision-makers may feel they have little choice but to 
indulge the general public’s fear of violence and looting by taking 
very public steps to reassure people in harm’s way that they can safely 
evacuate their homes because the National Guard or police stand 
ready to thwart potential looters. Decision-makers may reasonably 
fear that, without such reassurances, many will fail to evacuate. 
For example, Thomas Drabek, a groundbreaking disaster 
sociologist, has suggested that the best approach to dealing with the 
disaster myth of extensive post-disaster looting is to allay public fears 
by creating an “impression” that law enforcement is prepared to 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 127–28. 
 71.  Id. at 128. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 129. Of course, local budget constraints may make hiring more educated 
emergency managers difficult, especially given that in some smaller cities and rural areas, 
emergency managers may be part-time or may have multiple, unrelated job functions. 
 74.  See id. at 149–52. 
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prevent looting by heavy policing of the disaster area.75 Drabek 
suggests that local officials should “emphasize security” when dealing 
with the public and should “communicate loudly and clearly that 
security will be tight.”76 In addition, Drabek suggests that local law 
enforcement should “buttress” its forces with a “citizens’ patrol.”77 
Unfortunately, however, these solutions are prime examples of 
false acquiescence futility cascades that perpetuate both the myth 
itself and the deleterious consequences the myth engenders. While 
Drabek warns against “overallocat[ing] resources” to looting patrols,78 
official announcements that such patrols are necessary are likely to 
prompt additional media reporting of the myth and to bolster the 
public’s belief that looting and violence are typically serious problems 
in a disaster’s aftermath.79 Those heightened public fears, in turn, may 
increase public demand for excessive security measures that divert 
resources from other, more pressing needs. Law enforcement may 
also rely on those public fears to justify unnecessary restrictions on 
freedom and freedom of movement post-disaster. Moreover, 
Drabek’s suggestion that a citizens’ patrol be assembled to police for 
looting may well risk the kind of vigilante violence that was observed 
after Katrina. Indulging and reinforcing public fears of looting seems 
unlikely to be the right answer. 
The need for effective public education to counter the disaster 
myth of pervasive looting and violence is evident. Unfortunately, the 
challenges facing successful education campaigns are both real and 
difficult to surmount. Sunstein, for example, is sufficiently skeptical of 
the value of public education in countering overblown risk 
assessments that he asserts that the best solution is often to “[c]hange 
the subject.”80 Despite Sunstein’s well-founded skepticism, carefully 
designed disaster public-information campaigns, like environmental 
education and youth anti-smoking campaigns,81 may nonetheless be 
 
 75.  THOMAS E. DRABEK, THE HUMAN SIDE OF DISASTER 97 (CRC Press, 2d ed. 2010). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Cf. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 539 (2004) 
(acknowledging that aggressive government action taken to ward off excessive public fears of 
terrorism “affirms the legitimacy of the fear”). 
 80.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
125 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005) (suggesting that the best approach to managing public 
overreaction to “low probability risks” is often “[c]hang[ing] the subject”). 
 81.  See, e.g., Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Evidence of a Dose-Response Relationship Between 
“Truth” Antismoking Ads and Youth Smoking Prevalence, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 425, 
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among the most effective tools for countering disaster mythology. 
Public information campaigns could, for example, publicize the real 
tradeoffs that occur when the myth encourages public officials to 
prioritize law enforcement needs over search-and-rescue and other 
basic humanitarian relief. A greater public understanding of the costs 
of disaster myth perpetuation—including the real risks that aid will be 
delayed to those in need—might help halt the spread of information 
cascades during disasters as individuals will have a better sense that 
crediting and spreading “false positive” reports of violence and 
looting has real costs—costs that might affect them individually or 
their family, friends, and neighbors.82 Dampening information 
cascades would, in turn, likely diminish the strength of false 
acquiescence cascades, including both the reputational cascades 
identified by Kuran and Sunstein and the futility cascades identified 
in this article. 
Moreover, emotional risk assessments that reflect value 
judgments of the type identified by Kahan are most likely to be 
reshaped by public information campaigns that focus on altering the 
social meaning of disasters and reframing the values at stake. While 
the exact content of such campaigns would probably vary from 
community to community,83 if public information campaigns can help 
reconceptualize natural disasters as events that generally bring out 
the best in both people and communities, those campaigns might 
increase public skepticism about rumors of disaster atrocities and 
about the need for draconian military and police intervention. 
 In altering people’s conception of natural disasters, one 
substantial obstacle that public information campaigns will likely 
encounter is the phenomenon of “biased assimilation”:  
Biased assimilation refers to the fact that people assimilate new 
information in a biased fashion; those who have accepted false 
rumors do not easily give up their beliefs, especially when they have 
a strong emotional commitment to those beliefs; it can be 
 
428–30 (Mar. 2005) (suggesting that anti-smoking campaigns contributed to declines in youth 
smoking rates); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Individual 
Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1701, 1722 (2008) (finding that 
“[r]ecent literature reviews have concluded that more than half of the well-designed and funded 
[public information campaigns intended to promote individual behavioral changes that help the 
environment] have resulted in significant and positive behavior change”). 
 82.  See supra text accompanying note 31. 
 83.  See Kahan, supra note 27, at 764–65 (suggesting that risk education will be most 
effective if it “affirms rather than denigrates recipients’ cultural identities” and transforms the 
“social meaning” of the relevant risk). 
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exceedingly hard to dislodge what people think, even by presenting 
them with the facts.84 
“Biased assimilation” thus encapsulates the common-sense 
notion that people tend to process new information in light of their 
preexisting beliefs; their precommitments are particularly likely to 
influence their assimilation of new information if they have a strong 
emotional attachment to, or other investment in, those preexisting 
beliefs.85 
News coverage of Japan’s March 2011 earthquake and tsunami 
provided an interesting illustration of biased assimilation in the 
context of the disaster myth of widespread looting and violence. In 
the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami, news 
sources reported—often with surprise—that there was very little 
looting taking place in Japan.86 Rather than entertaining the 
possibility that the lack of looting in Japan might reflect a broader 
truth about human nature that should cause us to reconsider our 
deeply held—and mistaken—beliefs about post-disaster human 
behavior, newspapers and pundits sought to “explain away” the lack 
of looting as the result of some unique characteristic of Japanese 
society or culture.87 Indeed, rather than prompting reconsideration of 
the Katrina news coverage or discussion of the fact that much of the 
early Katrina reporting was overblown and inflammatory, many 
media reports on the Japan earthquake simply resuscitated and 
repeated the exaggerated claims of looting and violence perpetuated 
in Katrina’s immediate aftermath.88 The news reports contrasted the 
 
   84.   CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: HOW FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE 
THEM, WHAT CAN BE DONE 9 (2009) (emphasis omitted). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James & Russell Goldman, Japanese, Waiting in Line for 
Hours, Follow Social Order After Quake, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/japan-
victims-show-resilience-earthquake-tsunami-sign-sense/story?id=13135355 (“As Japanese 
survivors cope with food and gasoline shortages amidst the aftershocks and rising body count, 
they draw on a sense of social order. Unlike scenes in natural disasters in Haiti and New 
Orleans, there is little anger, no looting.”). 
 87. See Sun, supra note 9, at 1144 (citing, e.g., Christopher Beam, Stop, Thief! Thank You., 
SLATE (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.slate.com/id/2288514/ (attributing the lack of looting in 
Japan to specific features of the Japanese legal system and Japanese culture); see also Lisa Grow 
Sun, Op-Ed., Disasters Bring Out the Best in People, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 26, 2011, 
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/51497668-82/looting-disasters-violence-disaster.html.csp. 
 88. See Sun, Disasters Bring Out the Best in People; Pichai Chuensuksawadi, Op-Ed., Stoic 
Calm in the Face of Utter Calamity, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 15, 2011, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/226703/stoic-calm-in-the-face-of-utter-calamityi 
(comparing the calm reaction to the earthquake in Japan to purported “chaos and anarchy” in 
response to Katrina in New Orleans). 
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calm, orderly behavior of Japanese survivors with the imagined 
behavior of Katrina’s survivors. 
The difficulties of rooting out firmly entrenched beliefs about 
looting and violence after disasters suggest that public education 
campaigns might be most effective if they are focused on the youngest 
citizens. Many elementary schools provide children with basic 
information about disasters (by, for example, conducting earthquake 
drills). Education campaigns that teach children that while disasters 
are tragedies, they are tragedies that usually bring communities 
together, rather than tearing them apart in chaos and crime, might be 
effective in creating a less-jaundiced view of post-disaster human 
behavior among individuals who have yet to form strong opinions 
about the likelihood of looting and other criminal behavior in 
disasters’ aftermath. Any such campaigns should, of course, be 
subjected to empirical analysis to evaluate their effectiveness over 
time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Disaster myths—particularly the myth of widespread looting and 
violence—interfere with effective disaster response and recovery. The 
spread of disaster myths can be usefully analyzed as an availability 
cascade. Although there is certainly no panacea for the problem of 
disaster mythology, that analysis suggests that the spread of disaster 
mythology can perhaps be mitigated by changing the incentives of 
availability entrepreneurs who might otherwise perpetuate the myth, 
by hiring better-educated emergency managers to advise local 
officials in disaster decision-making, and by creating targeted public 
information campaigns—particularly campaigns aimed at young 
people—that will help alter the social meaning of disasters. While 
these approaches are unlikely to completely halt the perpetuation of 
disaster mythology, they are important first steps in promoting a 
more accurate understanding of typical post-disaster behavior and 
designing the most effective policy and legal framework for disaster 
response and recovery. 
 
